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THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS*
INTRODUCTORY
N O thoughtful observer will presume to gainsay the all-impor-
tant part which the oil business plays and will continue to
play in the industrial, commercial and social life of the civ-
ilized world. Long before the great war this fact was deeply im-
pressive, and was generally recognized. At the end of that conflict
it was said with much truth that the Allies had floated to victory
upon a sea of oil. Now, standing as we are at the threshold of a
new era rich in industrial and commercial promise, no man can
foresee nor even approximate the mighty expansion which will
characterize the business in the near and more remote future. This
much, however, appears certain. Petroleum products are now prac-
tically indispensable to the progress of modern industry and com-
merce. In a somewhat less degree they enter into almost every
phase of the daily life of civilized peoples. Therefore, all other
considerations aside, the growth and advancement of this pursuit
will undoubtedly keep pace with the natural expansion in other
lines of endeavor. But this assurance is a mere aspect of what
the future holds for the oil business. No substance now known
possesses within itself greater potential capacity to serve mankind.
The chemical and physical researches of the industry calculated to
discover new uses for petroleum and its products and to derive
new properties therefrom are yet in their infancy. In view of the
appalling economic crisis which confronts most of the countries,
the science of the enterprise will put itself to the unceasing task
* This is the first of a series of papers on "The Law of Oil and Gas." These papers
are based upon a course of lectures delivered by Mr. Veasey in the Law School during
the second semester of 1919-192o. A graduate of the School itl the class of 1902, Mr.
Veasey's long experience in the field of oil and gas law-for some time he has been
General Counsel of The Carter Oil Company-peculiarly fits him for the work which he
has undertaken in these lectures and papery. The rest will follow in succeeding numbers.
Tnz EmITO.
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of extracting new values from petroleum and of finding new and
more general uses for these new discoveries, as well as for discov-
eries made in the past. In these circumstances, pointing as they
do to an enormous and ever-increasing demand for the commodity,
the question of an adequate supply of crude material reaches the
highest importance. Even now, with much more of the industry and
trade of the world in a state of partial paralysis, and with all of
the American fields at least being exploited to their uttermost, the
crude supply barely meets the demand. Whether this equilibrium
can be maintained, or even approximated, when the normal activi-
ties of men are again fully resumed is at present a matter of gravest
concern to the industry.
Under pressure of this serious economic condition the petro-
leum industry must bend its efforts toward the complete exploita-
tion of the lands of, the United States for oil. Already oil is being
produced in seventeen of the American commonwealths, and in
eleven other states large areas are held under lease and explora-
tions on an extensive scale are in progress. Eventually every
stretch of American soil whith offers a reasonable hope of success
in the business, and which is not condemned by operations con-
ducted in the past, will be thoroughly tested for petroleum. In
this posture of affairs a strange situation is observable. No indus-
try involves greater property values, nor is there any enterprise
where success is shrouded in more uncertainty or where failure is
attended by greater financial loss. The Supreme Court of the
United States, in Twin-Lick Oil Company v. Marbury, says: "The
fluctuating character and value of this class of property is remark-
ably illustrated in the history of the production of mineral oil from
wells. Property worth thousands today is worth nothing tomor-
row; and that which would today sell for a thousand dollars as
its fair value, may, by the natural changes of a week or the
energy and courage of desperate enterprise, in the same time be
made to yield that much every day. * * * the class of property
here considered [is] subject to the most rapid, frequent, and violent
fluctuations in value of anything known as property."' The enor-
mous value of the property dealt with and the inherent uncertainty
of the enterprise would seem imperatively to demand a system of
jurisprudence which is specific and certain in the last degree. Un-
fortunately, however, the industry has been confronted with a con-
dition directly to the contrary, for there is no branch of American
law so obscure in decision, and so indefinite and conflicting in
I Twin.Lick Oil Co. v. Afarbury, 9Y U. S. 587 (1876).
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authority, as the "Law of Oil and Gas." Although, finally, the
courts of many jurisdictions reach a fairly sound conclusion on
most of the important questions which characterize this branch of
the law, these decisions were usually preceded by a series of ill-
considered, conflicting and impractical holdings which not only em-
barrassed the courts in the decision of the later cases, but which de-
feated or partially defeated the efforts of the industry to adapt the
prosecution of the business to those practical conditions which gave
greater assurance of success. Strangely enough, the courts of the
more recent oil-producing states have not profited by the experience
of the older jurisdictions. The industry has been obliged to strug-
gle against this peculiar posture of the cases in Oklahoma, Texas,
Louisiana, and to a certain extent in Illinois, with the same vigor
as characterized its efforts in that direction in Pennsylvania and
West Virginia.
As long as the production of oil was confined to a few districts
this subject was regarded by the legal profession generally as a
narrow and distinct specialty. The members of the bar who then
came in contact with the business were few in number. Accord-
ingly, there was no substantial reason for the law schools of the
country to give direct and comprehensive instruction in the juris-
prudence. Now, however, the industry has broadened in its impor-
tance. The greater portions of Kansas, Oklahoma, Louisiana and
Texas are now held under lease, and the work of testing for oil is
general throughout the non-producing sections of those states.
Moreover, all lands west of the Mississippi and vast areas in the
southern states are now regarded as possible oil territory. There-
fore, in these communities the bar generally will be brought into
direct relation with the enterprise. When oil is once discovered in
a locality there is a great and immediate enhancement of all prop-
erty values therein. Oil leases are ordinarily subject to forfeiture
for breach of conditions, and the unusual value of the lands involved
invites widespread and persistent litigation. Moreover, the legal
questions presented are usually complex and difficult. As a result
of these conditions work in this specialty is decidedly lucrative.
These considerations alone should attract the serious attention of
the lawyer just entering the practice, but of even greater impor-
tance is the constructive work which lies in the path of the profes-
sion in the new oil states. In those jurisdictions the rules of deci-
sion on every question peculiar to the subject are yet to be estab-
lished. It will lie with the members of the bar therein to forestall
in some degree at least a repetition of the errors of the courts in
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the earlier oil-producing states. The ability of the profession to
accomplish this task will depend upon its grasp of the underlying
principles of oil and gas law. In these circumstances the law schools
of the country possess an unusual opportunity for serving the pro-
fession by offering special training in this novel jurisprudence. It
was these considerations which influenced the faculty of the Law
School of the University of Michigan to take the initiative in add-
ing the "Law of Oil and Gas" to its curriculum.
When the breadth and complexity of the subject are taken
into account it follows that there are many questions related to
the inquiry which cannot be touched upon. The scope of these
papers will be thus limited. To begin with, the fundamentals of
the law of oil and gas will be treated comprehensively. In the
second place, an attempt will be made to bring the student within
the peculiar atmosphere of the whole range of oil and gas cases.
If . this effort proves successful much of the apparent conflict in
the decisions will be dissipated, and a point of view will be pro-
vided for the consideration of the many incidental questions which
a more extended research will disclose. Finally, it is intended that
the lectures shall be practical in their tendency, to the end that the
student shall obtain a ready and workable conception of the entire
subject.
CHAPTER I
THt SUBJICT IN GENERAL
(I) Elementary Considerations.
It is commonly known that petroleum and natural gas are
hydro-carbons usually discovered in sands, sandstones and lime-
stones beneath the earth's surface. Sands and sandstones are the
more usual reservoirs. Contrary to the popular impression, oil
and gas do not accumulate in subterranean pools or streams in the
sense that liquids collect upon the surface of the ground. They
manifest their presence in the oil and gas sands by a saturation
thereof. The capacity of the sands and sandstones to hold these
fluids is dependent relatively upon the shape and arrangement of
the grains. A loose, soft, and porous sand, if it contain oil, is more
prolific in production under normal conditions than a hard or less
pervious formation. This statement has judicial recognition.' Not
infrequently a structure confines natural gas only, but as a general
rule both oil and gas are found in the same deposit. When this
condition obtains the gas is usually found in the upper reaches of
I Kleppner v. Lemon, 176 Pa. 502, 35 Atl. og; Hall v. South Penn Oil Co., 71 W.
Va. 82, 76 S. E. 124.
THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS
the sand, while the oil, by reason of its specific gravity, is found in
the lower sand. In the early life of many wells producing from a
soft and porous sand the pressure of the gas and water inhabiting
the structure where the oil is found causes the oil to flow. Within
a comparatively short time, however, the pressure declines to such
an extent as to necessitate the production of the oil by the process
of pumping. The greater number of wells must be pumped from
the beginning.
2
Regardless of the experience of the operator and the advance-
ment made in petroleum geology in recent years, the fact still
remains that the drilling of a well is the only circumstance which
will determine with certainty whether a particular tract of land is
oil-bearing or not.' In some fields a fair degree of reliance may
be placed upon the geologic indications of the presence of, oil. In
other districts very little dependence can be placed upon these con-
ditions. In a region where the outcroppings are relatively well-
defined, petroleum geology is of assistance to the operator in the
following particulars. By that means it may be determined with a
fair degree of accuracy whether or not a structure favorable for
the accumulation of oil and gas underlies the particular tract of
land. Obviously, this information reduces the hazard of the ven-
ture. Furthermore, the probable depth of the sand regarded as
promising by the geologist is susceptible of ascertainment, and a
method of estimating the cost of the test well thereby provided.
Finally, the data of the geologist indicate in a relative degree at
least the most favorable location on the structure for the drilling
of the well. The information thus afforded tends to prevent the
drilling of wells on the edges of a geologic structure where the
sand is usually thin and more likely to be unproductive than else-
where in the particular deposit. These aids, while of decided value,
fall immeasurably short of demonstrating the presence of oil or
gas with certainty. The test by drilling is still indispensable. In
recent years it has been the almost universal custom to locate wells
in accordance with geologic data, supplemented, of course, by a
due regard for development in the vicinity, if any. Notwithstand-
ing these precautions, it is estimated that twenty-two per cent of
the wells drilled in the year i919 were failures. This record includes
wells drilled in the immediate neighborhood of producing lands,
where the uncertainty of the venture was not so pronounced. When
wells in territory comparatively proved are eliminated, and when
Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, So S. E. 368.
2 Consumers Gas Co. v. Littler, z6z Ind. 320, 70 N. E. 363.
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wild-cat wells alone are taken into consideration, it is probable
that from seventy to seventy-five per cent. of the wells drilled are
non-productive.
There are other important elements of uncertainty which char-
acterize the business. There is a high degree of risk in the mere
mechanical process of drilling a well to a great depth. Tools are
lost in the hole, and unexpected formations are encountered which
frequently necessitate the abandonment of the operation completely
or the drilling of another well, which in turn is attended by the
same general hazard. Wells are shot by immense charges of nitro-
glycerin designed to increase the production, and premature explo-
sions which destroy the well or damage it greatly are of frequent
occurrence. The financial loss incident to these failures becomes
impressive when the assertion is made that the average cost of
wells completed during the year 1919 was $17,500. Even where
the test well results in production the hazard of the enterprise con-
tinues. A dry hole will be drilled within a few feet of a large pro-
ducing well. A failure will result where the well is located between
or among producing wells, and then again, small wells are drilled
in the immediate vicinity of large producers. After production is
once realized on a lease the life of the well or wells is wholly uncer-
tain. Where the wells are small at the beginning the operator must
either contemplate an ultimate loss in the undertaking or a long
and tedious effort to recover sufficient oil to repay him for his
investment. Wells of large initial capacity oftimes decline with
great rapidity, and in some of the most promising districts water
will find its way into the oil sand and either destroy or greatly
impair the producing capacity of all wells therein. These general
observations demonstrate that, despite the skill and experience of
the operator and notwithstanding the teachings of modern geology,
the prosecution of the oil business is attended by greater uncertainty
in its results and is responsible for more financial disaster than is
true of any other industry of the country, however speculative in
character or tendency it may be. All questions which are to be
here examined must be considered in the light of the inherent risks
and hazards which characterize this peculiar enterprise throughout.
(2) The Fugacious Character of Oil and Gas.
No question to be examined rises to higher importance than
the one here suggested. This subject will be comprehended to the
exact extent that we reach a clear and definite understanding of
the peculiar nature and habits of oil and gas. Practical operators
and petroleum geologists agree upon the proposition that oil and
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gas, after their original accumulation in the structure which they
inhabit, do not migrate laterally to an appreciable extent under
normal conditions. These substances possess the qualities of fluids,
however, and when a well taps the producing strata the oil and gas,
influenced by the rock pressure, are inclined to seek this opening;
and accordingly each well drains a greater or less area within the
structure. Therefore, when a particular well is near the boundary of
a tract of land, and where both tracts are underlaid by a com-
mon deposit, a portion of the production from the well may be
drawn from the adjacent premises. It is this wandering and fugi-
tive tendency of oil and gas which is entirely responsible for the
evolution of the law of oil and gas. Were it not for this attribute,
which at once distinguishes these substances from solid minerals,
which maintain their situs until removed by mining, the law of
mines, supplemented, perhaps, by certain principles taken from the
law of landlord and tenant, would control the decision of all ques-
tions relating to the subject. As it is, all legal rules peculiar to
the law of mines must be applied to the decision of any question
touching oil and gas in a qualified sense only, and with a due
regard to the fugitive character of the property dealt with.4 It is
worthy of comment that the vagrant character of oil and gas was
clearly recognized by the first reported case on the subject, although
the case was decided some years before the mining of oil and gas
attained commercial importance.5 In one of the early Pennsylvania
cases it is said: "The discovery of petroleum led to new forms of
leasing land. Its fugitive and wandering existence within the limits
of a particular tract was uncertain, and assumed certainty only by
actual development founded upon experiment." 6 The courts take
judicial notice of this propensity,7 and this peculiar habit is now
universally recognized by the courts in the oil states. s Gas being
4 Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, 18 At]. 724 (1889); Ohio Oil Co.
v. Indiana, i77 U. S. x9o (igoo); Brown: v. Spilman, i55 U. S. 665 (895).
5Hail v. Reed, i5 B. Munroe (Ky.) 479 (1854).
eBrown v. Vandergrift, 8o Pa. i42 (1875).
?Barnard v. Mowngahela Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 At. 8oi (907); Brown v.
Spilman, supra; Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S. W. (Tex.) 6r9 (1919); Huggins v. Daley,
99 Fed. 6o6 (rgoo).
$Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 At. 714 (1893); Wettengel v. Gormley, 16o Pa.
559, 28 At!. 934 (1894); Burgan v. South Penn Oil Co., 243 Pa. 128, 89 At. 823 (1914);
Hall v. Vernon, 47 W. Va. 295, 34 S. E. 764 (1899); Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278,
so S. E. 236 (19o5); Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N. E. 399 (1897);
Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., 155 Ind. 566, 57 N. E. 912 (i9o); North-
western Ohio Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E. 494 (1903); Poe v. Ulrey,
233 Ill. 56, 84 N. E. 46 (igo8); Watford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E.
53 (19oB); Fairbanks v. Warruyn, 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N. E. 983 (1914); Murray v.
Allard, ioo Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355 (897); Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating
Co., 117 Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368 (1903); Louisville Gas Co. v. Kentucky Heating Co., 132
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volatile, the substance has a greater tendency to migrate than oil.'
The following quotations from some of the opinions illustrate the
viewpoint of the courts upon the question of drainage by adjacent
wells: "From common knowledge of the character of oil and
gas it may be said that drainage, in a narrow and limited sense, may
be effected by adjacent wells. * * * Hence to make out such a
case, it would be necessary to show wells in close proximity to the
leased premises, and producing substantial quantities of oil or gas."1
"There is no presumption that a well drains in a uniform degree
the oil-bearing rock surrounding the same, assuming that the forma-
tion-is fairly regular. This presumption could not apply where the
territory was spotted."'1 "There is, as we may readily conclude, a
general concensus of opinion among those engaged in the produc-
tion of oil and gas as a business that these substances may be drawn
from one tract through wells on other tracts, but that the distance
is merely conjectural. But how much or how far no one can
answer."'
12
We are now brought to the consideration of the crucial point
of our discussion under this heading. We again advert to the fact
that oil and gas in their natural state do not migrate laterally, but
to the contrary, maintain their original situs. The only circum-
stance which induces their perceptible movement is a well pene-
trating the producing strata, and even then drainage is not an inev-
itable result. Whether there is any drainage by adjacent wells in
a particular case, and the extent of that drainage, are pure ques-
tions of fact to be determined by the capacity of the adjoining
wells, the porosity of the sand, regularity of the producing forma-
tion, the degree of rock pressure, and such other circumstances as
would control the judgment of a practical operator in reaching a
conclusion respecting the matter of drainage. When the earlier
Ky. 435, "1 S. W. 374 (z9o8); Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil Co., 103 Ark. 17.,
146 S. W. 12Z (1912); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 1o7 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915);
Rivcs v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913); DeMoss v. Sample, 143 La.
243, 78 So. 482 (r9z8); Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68 Kan. 691, 75 Pac. 99s (1904);
Mound City Brick & Gas Co. v. Goodspeed, 83 Kan. 136, io9 Pac. 1002 (igo); Kolach.
hey v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, iio Pac. 9o2 '(z9ro); Frank Oil Co. v. Belleview Gas
Co., 29 Okla. 719, 119 PaC. 260 (1911); Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. (Okla.) 86 (zgi8);
Kinbley v. Luckey, 179 Pac. (Okla.) 928 (1919).
9 Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, supra; Tyner v. Peoples Gas Co., 131 Ind. 277,
31 N. E. 59 (1892); Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., supra; State v. Ohio
Oil Co., i5o Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 809 (1898); Wood County Petroleum Co. v. Transportation
Co., 28 NV. Va. 2io (x886).
"Hall v. South Penn Oil Co., 71 W. Va. 82, 76 S. E. 124 (1912).
"Ammons v. South Penn Oil Co., 47 W. Va. 61o, 35 S. E. 2004 (i9oo); Duffleld v.
Rosenweig, 144 Pa. 520, 23 Atl. 4 (1891).
12Jennings v. Southern Carbon Co., 73 W. Va. 215, 80 S. E. 368 (1913).
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cases were decided the courts possessed little, if any, accurate
knowledge of the nature and habits of these minerals. Inasmuch
as they presumed to take judicial notice of the peculiar character-
istics thereof, they fell into two errors which unfortunately, have
persevered throughout the decisions. In the first place, the con-
ception was adopted that oil and gas in a state of nature move
within the structure. If that were true, oil and gas in varying
degrees would escape from the lands of one owner to the lands of
another where the two tracts were underlaid by a common deposit,
even though there was no drainage by wells. In the second place,
a close examination of the cases indicates that the courts are inclined
to over-emphasize the existence and extent of drainage by adjacent
operations. The first proposition is demonstrated by the following
language in the cases: Oil and gas have the power of self-trans-
mission.' 3 They move from one tract of land to another by percola-
tion,14 and they possess the power to escape from one tract of land to
another without the volition of the owner.' 5 They move from one
tract of land to another, being a part of the land under which they
tarry for the time being.' Petroleum and natural gas shift in local-
ity and are inclined to run from place to place.' In a recent Texas
case it is said: "For the natural result of stopping the production
of oil or gas from the tract on which it was discovered in paying
quantities for such a period of time would be to invite its drainage
to adjacent tracts, to say nothing of the danger of the oil's migra-
tion."18 The danger of loss to the lessor through the movement of
the oil and gas to neighboring lands results in the construction of
oil and gas leases in favor of the lessor and against the lessee.'9
It is true that these expressions attributing the capacity of self-
transmission of oil and gas are usually coupled with references to
the probability of drainage by operations on adjoining premises;
but the two statements appear in the disjunctive, thereby indicating
that the courts are firm in the conviction that there are two distinct
circumstances which cause drainage: first, the propensity of the oil
and gas to wander at will within the structure where there are no
23 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 19o (19oo); Richard v. Cowley, 8o So. (Ala.,
1918) 419.
1
4Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N. E. 399 (1897); Texas Co. v. Dough-
erty, 1o7 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915).
5 Poe v. Ulrey, 233 II. 56, 84 N. E. 46 (1go8); Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68
Kan. 691, 75 Pac. 995 (1904); Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil Co., 103 Ark. 175,
146 S. W. 122 (1952).
"Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. V7, 49 N. E., 399 (5897).
"Logan Natural Gas Co. v. Great Southern Gas Co., 126 Fed. 623 (1903).
13Grubb v. McAfee, .12 S. W. (Tex.) 464 (1919).
"Superior Oil Co. V. Mehlin, 25 Okla. 8og, ioB Pac. 545 (5910).
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neighboring operations; and secondly, migration induced by wells
penetrating the strata. This conclusion is further supported by that
line of cases which finds a complete analogy between the habits
of oil and gas and animals ferae vaturae.
20 Obviously, wild ani-
mals in a state of nature wander at will, and when an absolute re-
semblance is found between the two we are brought to the irre-
sistible conclusion that the courts entertain the fixed idea that oil
and gas likewise are vagrant even in their natural state.
This fundamental misconception of the nature and habits of
oil and gas has produced great confusion of judicial thought upon
the subject. From the very beginning of the industry the storm-
center of litigation in the jurisprudence has been the degree of
diligence which an oil and gas lessee should exercise in the devel-
opment of the lands covered by his lease. The books abound in
cases where lessors sought the cancellation of leases on the ground
that the lessee had not observed the measure of diligence in the
operation of the property which was stipulated in the lease or which
was implied by law. Equally numerous are suits for the specific
performance of these obligations, or for damages for the breach
thereof. Manifestly, the peculiar nature of the subject-matter will
have an important if not controlling influence in the decision of
these questions. If, therefore, the courts entertain a false concep-
tion of the inherent nature and habits of the subject-matter, pro-
nounced error necessarily follows. Supplementing what we have
said regarding the viewpoint of the courts on this question we find
these expressions in the decisions: "Perhaps in no other business
is prompt performance of contracts so essential to the rights of the
parties, or delay by one party likely to prove so injurious to the
other." 1 This judicial announcement is repeated in a late Ken-
tucky case.2 2  In an early Federal case originating in West Vir-
ginia it is said: "There is, perhaps, no other business in which
prompt performance is so essential to the rights of the parties, or
delay so likely to prove injurious-no other class of contracts in
which time is so much of the essence. There is no other branch
of mining where greater damage is done by delay. Coal and pre-*
cious metals lie in horizontal veins or in pockets. They remain
where they are until removed. Oil and gas are the most uncertain,
" Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, IS Ad. 724 (z889); Hague v.
Wheeler, 157 Pa. 324, 27 At. 714 (1893); Wood County Petroleum Co. v. Transportation
Co., 28 W. Va. 210 (1886); State v. Ohio Oil Co., ISO Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 8og (x898);
In re Illuminating Oil Co., 43 Okla. 307, 142 Pac. 907 (0914); Rich v. Doneghey, 177
Pac. (O1a.) 86 (x9iC); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (915).
1Afunroe v. Armstrong, 96 Pa. 307 (ISSo).
2
1
Hnghes v. Busseyville Oil & Gas Co., ISo Ky. 545, 203 S. W. 515 (i9x8).
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fluctuating, volatile and fugitive of all mining properties. ' 23  In
the later cases the courts do not receive proof upon the nature of
oil and gas, nor have their views in this regard kept pace with the
expansion of practical and scientific knowledge upon the subject.
Inasmuch as they predicate their conception of the matter upon
judicial knowledge alone, the expressions found in the earlier deci-
sions relating to the question are persistently repeated in the later
cases. Hence the error perseveres.
The consequence of this basic misconception of the fugitive
habits of oil and gas is immediately apparent. If, as the courts
hold, oil and gas move from one tract of land to another even in
the absence of wells producing this result, the interests of land-
owner from whose tract the oil has a tendency to escape demand
the prompt development of the property in order to prevent drain-
age. In order to meet the necessities qf the situation two doctrines
of far-reaching importance were enunciated in the early cases:
first, it was declared that all covenants in an oil and gas lease re-
specting the time and extent of operations should be construed
strictly against the lessee and in favor of the lessor for the pur-
pose of preventing drainage. The second principle was that certain
implied covenants or conditions would be read into the lease in
order to bring about the prompt development of the premises. The
vice which attaches to this position lies in the fact that oil and gas,
like solid minerals, maintain their original place of deposit excepting
when withdrawn through neighboring wells. Therefore, when
the record fails to show drainage by adjacent operations, there is
no reason for greater diligence in the development of an oil prop-
erty than in the case of any other mining venture. By degrees, as
is evidenced by the later cases, the courts are receding from the con-
trolling influence of these doctrines, and are holding oil and gas
lessees to the measure of diligence expressly provided for in the
leases, just as would be the case if solid minerals were involved.
In brief, the present tendency of the courts is to construe these con-
tracts as written rather than in the light of the two doctrines already
alluded to. At the same time the courts in the more recent oil-
producing states not possessing a grasp of the entire range of oil
and gas cases are always subject to the influence of these early
decisions. In proceeding with this inquiry, therefore, it is of the
highest importance to read the early cases, restrained by a definite
understanding that they were decided in the light of a mistaken
conception of the true nature of oil and gas.
23 Huggins v. Dalcy, 99 Fed. 6o6 (igoo).
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(3) Oil and Gas in Place.
It is well settled in every jurisdiction that oil and gas in place
are minerals, and as such they are part of the realty,2 4 but upon sever-
ance they become personalty.2 - It is said that oil and gas are min-
erals, and while in place are as much a part of the realty as timber,
coal, or iron ore.20 The term "minerals" is not confined to metallic
substances'." Oil and gas are minerals because they are found
beneath the surface of the earth and yield a profit,28 and also be-
cause they fall within the classification of minerals, under the broad
division of all matter into animal, vegetable and mineral ;29 but oil
"4Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. 357 (1862); Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (x867); Appeal
of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198 (1879); Gill v. Weston, izo Pa. 305, 312, 1 At!. 921 (1885);
Hague v. Wheeler, i57 Pa. 324, 27 At!. 714 (1893); Blakeley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425,
34 At!. 564 (1896); Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231
, 
i9 S. E. 436 (2894); Wilson
v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 781 (1897); Haskell v. Sutton, 53 W. Va. 206, 44 S. E.
533 (I9O3); Rymer v. South Penn "Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 530, 46 S. E. 559 (1904); Warren
v. Boggs, 97 S. E. (W. Va., 19x8) 589; Pittsburgh Gas Co. v. Ankrom, 97 S. E. (W. Va.,
19x8) 593; Brown v. Spilman, 155 U. S. 665 (1895); Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St.
317, 49 N. E. (2897); Northwestern Ohio Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E.
494 (9o3); Nonamaker v. Amos, 73 Ohio St. 263, 76 N. E. 949 (09os); Hughes v.
United Pipe Lines, 119 N. Y. 423, 23 N. E. 1042 (189o); Wagner v. Mallory, 169 N. Y.
501, 62 N. E. 584 (1902); Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37.Ind. App. 25,
76 N. E. 525 09o5); Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 225 (ipi); Kahle v.
Crown Oil Co., i8o Ind. 131, too N. E. 681 (19x3); Fairbanks v. Warrum, 56 Ind. App.
337, 104 N. E. 983 (1914); Poe V. Ulrey, 233 Il1. 56, 84 N. E. 46 (29o8); Watford Oil
& Gas Co. V. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53 (i9o8); Lanyon Zinc Co. v. Freeman, 68
Kan. 69r, 75 Pac. 995 (1904); Mound City Brzck Co. v. Goodspeed, 83 Kan. 236, 2o9
Pac. 2oo2 (xgo); Isomn v. Rex Crude Oil Co., 147 Cal. 659, 663, 82 Pac. 319 (19o);
China Land & Water Co. v. Hamaker, 178 Pac. (Cal. 1918) 738; In re Indian Ty.
Illuminating Co., 43 Okla. 307, 142 Pac. 997 (1914); Barker v. Campbell.Ratcliff Land
Co., 167 Pa. (Okla., 1917) 468; Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. (Okla., i9z8) 86; Kimbley
V. Luckey, 79 Pac. (Okla., 2929) 928; Hall v. Reed, 15 B. Monroe (Ky., x854) 479;
Murray v. Allred, oo Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355 (1897); Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial
Oil Co., 103 Ark. 175, 246 S. W. 122 (X922); Whited v. Johnson, 167 S. W. (Tex., 1924)
812; Texas Co. v. Daugherty 107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (i925); Etchison Drilling Co.
v. Flournoy, 231 La. 442, 59 So. 867 (1912); Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178,
62 So. 623 (1913).
=Hail v. Reed, supra; Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil Co., supra; Kier v. Peter-
son, supra; Appeal of Stoughton, supra; Cassell v. Crothers, 193 Pa. 359, 44 At. 446
(899); Carter v. Tyler County Court, 45 W. Va. 8o6, 32 S. E. 216 (x899); Warren v.
Boggs, supra; Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., supra; Crystal Ice Co. v. Marion Gas Co., 35 Ind.
App. 295, 74 N. E. 25 (29o5).
21 Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231, 29 S. E. 436 (2894); Rymer v. South Penis
Oil Co., 54 W. Va. 530, 46 S. E. 559 (1904); Northwestern Ohio Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68
Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E. 494 (29o3); Rupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 494 (921);
Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122 (1912).
27 Poe v. Ulrey, 233 Ill. s6, 84 N. E. 46 (i9o8); Murray v. Allred, oo Tenn. zoo,
43 S. W. 355 (i897).
2 1
Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S. E. 307 (29o8); Freudenberger
v. Simmons, 75 W. Va. 337, 83 S. E. 995 (1914); Horse Creek Land Co. v. Midkiff, 82
W. Va. 6z6, 95 S. E. 26 (29x8); Gill v. Weston, i1o Pa. 305, 312, At. 921 (z885);
Murray v. Allred, supra.
"Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. St. 295, 62 AtI. 832 (29o6); Banard-Argue-Roth.Slearns Oil
& Gas Co. v. Farquharson, Am. Ann. Cas. 1913 B, p. 1212 (2912).
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and gas are not synonymous terms.30 Notwithstanding the fugitive
character of these minerals, they may be granted or reserved sepa-
rate and apart from the surface, 3 in which event they constitute
a distinct corporate estate.3 2 A grant or reservation of oil and gas
under the surface carries the right to use so much of the surface as
is reasonably necessary for mining such mineral. 33 Where oil and
gas are severed from the surface by deed or reservation, pos-
session of the surface is not possession of the oil or gas, mining
operations being essential to possession thereof.3 4  While oil and
gas may be granted or reserved distinct from the surface, a co-
tenant may not grant or reserve the oil or gas attributable to his
interest, because in so doing a new and distinct tenancy in common
is created against the other tenants in common. 3   Recurring again
to the main question-namely, that oil and gas may be granted or
reserved apart from the surface-it should be observed that an
element of confusion has crept into the cases in some jurisdictions
where the subject was dealt with. In Oklahoma, in two compara-
tively early cases which involved the nature of oil and gas leases
rather than deeds conveying oil and gas, the court laid down the
broad doctrine that oil and gas while in the earth, unlike solid min-
erals, are not the subject of ownership distinct from the soil, and
3*Kitchen v. Smith, zoz Pa. St. 452 (1882); Truby v. Palmer, 3 Penn. Sup. Court
Cases x56, 6 At. 74 (i886); Allen v. Palmer, 136 Pa. 556, 20 At. 516 (1890); Wood Co.
Petroleum Co. v. W. Va. Transportation Co., 28 W. Va. 210 (1886); Ball v. Freeman,
77 W. Va. z56, 87 S. E. 9z (rgi5); Cooke v. Gulf Refining Co., 127 La. 592, 53 So. 874
(1911); Barnard-Argue-Roth-Stearns Oil & Gas Co. v. Farquharson, supra.
'Lillibrdge v. Coal Co., 143 Pa. 293, 22 Atl. xo35 (z891); Chartiers Coal Co. v.
Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 Adt. 597 (893); Jennings v. Beale, xS8 Pa. 283, 27 AtI. 948
(1893); Mandel v. Gharing, 256 Pa. 121, oo At!. 535 (1917); PTeston v. White, 57 WN.
Va. 278, 50 S. E. 236 (igoS); Columbia Gas Co. v. Moore, 81 W. Va. 164, 93 S. E.
o51 (1917); Carter v. Esten, 3o Ky. Law Rep. 1144, 100 S. W. 308 (1907); Ball v.
Clark, 150 Ky. 383, 150 S. W. 359 (x9r2); Murray v. Allred, supra; Graciosa Oil Co.
v. Santa Barbara, iSS Cal. 140, 99 Pac. 483 (r9o9); Osborn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil
Co., supra; Whited v. Johnson, x67 S. W. (Tex., 1914) 812; Texas Co. v. Daugherty,
107 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (19z5); McConnell v. Pierce, 210 Il. 627, 71 N. E. 622
(1904); Moore v. Grifln, 72 Kan. 164, 83 Pac. 395 (x905); Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff
Land Co., z67 Pac. (Okla., r917) 468; Ramey v. Stephney, 173 Pac. (Okla., 1918) 72;
DeMoss v. Sample, 143 La. 243, 78 So. 482 (19r8); Calhoun v. Ardis, 144 La. 311, 8o
So. 548 (1919).
3 Preston v. White, supra; Texas Co. v. Daugherty, supra; Jennilngs v. Beale, supra;
Chartiers Coal Co. v. Mellon, supra.
"3Ramey v. Stephney, supra; Curtiss v. Chartiers Oil Co., 88 Ohio St. 594, io6 N. E.
1053 (1913); Chartiers Coal Co. v. Mellon, supra.
"Jackson v. Dulaney, 67 W. Va. 309, 67 S. E. 795 (1910); Murray v. Allred, supra;
Northcut v. Church, x35 Tenn. 541, s88 S. W. 220 (iq96); Scott v. Laws, 215 S. W.
(Ky., 1919) 81; Westmoreland Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, x8 Atl. 724 (1889);
Erskine v. Forest Oil Co., So Fed. 583 (895).11
Ball v. Clark, 15o Ky. 383, 150 S. W. 359 (1912); Hall v. Vernon, 47 W. Va. 297,
34 S. E. 764 (r899). See also: Benedict v. Torrent, 83 Mich. i~z; Adams v. Briggs
Iron Co., 7 Cush. (Mass.) 361; Boston Franklinite Co. v. Conditt, 19 N. J. Eq. 394.
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the grant of the oil and gas, therefore, is a grant not of the oil that
is in the ground but of such a part as the grantee may find.
6 But
in later cases, where conveyances of oil and gas were directly in-
volved instead of oil and gas leases, the court stated that the lan-
guage in K6lachney v. Galbreath and Frank Oil Company v. Belle-
view Gas Company should be limited to oil and gas leases; and it
was here held that the right to go upon land for the purpose of
prospecting and taking oil and gas therefrom is a proper subject
of sale, and may be granted or reserved.
7 It is to be noted that
the Oklahoma court distinguishes between a grant or reservation
of oil and gas in place and the grant or reservation of the right to
explore for and take these minerals. This distinction is wholly
superficial. The Louisiana court also found it necessary to explain
some of the earlier holdings of that court on this question. In
Rives v. Gulf Refining Company, where the nature of an oil and
gas lease was involved, the court announced the same broad doc-
trine which had been previously enunciated by the Oklahoma court.
3
In later cases, however, involving the conveyance of oil and gas,
that court limited the application of the Rives case and affirmed
the principle that oil and gas was susceptible of severance from
the surface by grant, reservation or exception.
39 In Illinois, where
the nature of an oil and gas lease was under consideration, it was
held that these minerals were not the subject of ownership distinct
from the surface.40 Yet this court, in a former case, had held that
even an oil and gas lease constituted a freehold interest in the
land.41 A most distinctive case on this general question is Texas
Company v. Daugherty.
4 2 It is worthy of comment that the court
had under consideration a lease for oil and gas mining purposes
rather than a deed, but by the plain terms of the lease it was sought
to grant the oil and gas in place rather than a mere license or privi-
lege to explore. The court adverted to the tendency of some juris-
dictions to distinguish between a conveyance of oil and gas in place
and a conveyance of solid minerals. This position was definitely
answered by the following observation: "Being a part of the realty
2OKolachuey v. Galbreath, 26 Okla. 772, izo Pac. 902 (igro); Frank 
Oil Co. v.
Belleview Gas Co., 29 Okla. 719, 1i9 Pac. 260 (191i).
2'Barkcr v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 167 Pac. (Okla., 1917) 
468. To the same
effect: Ramey v. Stephney, 173 Pac. (Okla., 191S) 72.
"Rives v. Gulf Refinind Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).
-IODe3loss v. Santple, "43 La. 243, 78 So. 482 (igiS); 
Calhoun v. Ardis, 144 La.
31. 80 So. 548 (1919).
40 Warford Oil & Gas Co. v. Shipman, 233 Ill. 9, 84 N. E. 53 (19o8).
4 1
Bruner v. Hicks, 230 Ill. 556, 82 N. E. 888 (1907).
42 Texas Co. v. Daugherty, T07 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 717 (1915).
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while in place, it would seem to logically follow that whenever they
are conveyed, while in that condition or possessing that status, a
conveyance of an interest in the realty results." After referring
to those cases which apparently draw a distinction between the
conveyance of solid minerals in place and the conveyance of oil
and gas in place, on the ground that the latter are vagrant in char-
acter, this court continues: "But it is difficult to perceive a sub-
stantial ground for the distinction. A purchaser of them within the
ground assumes the hazard of their absence through the possibility
of their escape from beneath the particular tract of land, and, of
course, if they are not discovered the conveyance is of no effect,
just as the purchase of solid minerals within the ground incurs
the risk of its absence, and therefore a futile venture. But let it
be supposed that they have not escaped and are in repose within the
strata beneath the particular tract and capable of possession by
appropriation from it. There they clearly constitute a part of the
realty. Is the possibility of their escape to render them, while in
place incapable of conveyance, or is their ownership while in that
condition, with the exclusive right to take them from the land, any-
thing less than ownership of an interest in the land? Conceding
that they are fluent in their nature, and may depart from the land
before brought into absolute possession, will it be denied that so
long as they have not departed they are a part of the land? * * *
The argument ignores the equal possibility of their presence, and
that the parties have contracted upon the latter assumption. * * *
In other words, the question, it seems to us, reduces itself to this:
If the oil and gas, the subject of the conveyance, are in fact not
beneath or within the land, and are therefore not capable of being
reduced to possession, the conveyance is of no effect. But if they
have not departed and are beneath it, they are there as a part of
the realty; and their conveyance while in place, if the instrument
be given any effect, is consequently the conveyance of an interest
in the realty." The reasoning of this case is unanswerable, and
the conclusions there reached are not only supported by principle
but are likewise upheld by the overwhelming weight of authority,
as has already been indicated. As a corollary to this proposition
it may be said further that the grant, reservation or exception of
all minerals without reference to oil and gas in specific terms, in-
cludes those substances.4 3 On this point it is held in California
4Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va., 317, 6, S. E. 307 (x9o8); Freudenberger v.
Simmnons, 75 W. Va. 337, 83 S. E. 995 (1gr4); Columbia Gas & Electric Co. v. Moore,
81 v. Va. 164, 93 S. E. 1o5 (917); Horse Creek Land Co. v. Midkiff, 81 IV. Va. 6x6,
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that a reservation of mineral land from a railroad land 
grant made
under authority of an act of Congress includes lands valuable 
for
petroleum, although the act under consideration was adopted 
in
1871, when the exploration of lands for these purposes 
in the West
could not have been in the contemplation of Congress.
4" While the
foregoing states the general rule, the English courts and 
the courts
of Pennsylvania and Ohio seem to stand in opposition 
thereto. 45
The Banard case was appealed to the English Privy Council 
from
the Province of Ontario, and the question involved was 
whether
natural gas was included in a reservation of all minerals and springs
of oil under the land. The court specifically held that natural 
gas
was a substance essentially different from oil, and that the 
reser-
vation of gas would not be included in that term. It was 
in evi-
dence that natural gas had no commercial value until long 
after the
date of the deed, and that, therefore, natural gas could 
not have
been in the minds of the parties when the deed was made. 
The
leading Pennsylvania case on this question is Dunham 
v. Kirk-
patrick.4" In commenting on the attitude of the Pennsylvania court
on this subject it must be kept in mind that from the beginning 
of
the industry in that state it is consistently held that oil and 
gas are
minerals, 4 the only exception being when that term is used 
in con-
veyancing. In the Dunham case the principle is announced 
that a
reservation of all minerals in a conveyance did not include oil 
and
gas because, in the popular mind, metallic substances only were
regarded as minerals. In brief, the minds of the parties did not
meet on the question that oil and gas were included in the 
reser-
vation. A later decision of that court is in direct conflict with the
95 S. E. 26 (igg); Murray v. Allred, zoo Tenn. 1oo, 43 
S. W. 355 (1897); Scott v.
Laws, 215 S. W. (Ky., 1919) 81; Weaver v. Richards, x56 
Mich. 320, 12o N. W. 88
(19o9); Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 167 Pac. (Okla., 
1917) 468; McCombs v.
Stephenson, 154 Ala. 1o9, 44 So. 867 (1907); Calhoun 
v. Ardis, 144 La. 3zr, So So.
548 (i919); Luse v. Boatman 217 S. W. (Tex., 1919) 
io96. See also Ky. Diamond
Mining, etc. v. Transvaal Diamond Co., 141 Ky. 97, 
132 S. W. 397, Ann. Cas. 191z C,
417.
4Chino Land & Water Co. v. Hanaker, 178 Pac. (Cal., r9r8) 738. See also: Burke
v. Southern Pacific Co., 234 U. S. 669 (1914); United States 
v. Southern Pacific Co.,
Advance Op. Dec- r5, 1919, P. 55-
41 Barnard.Argue-Roth-Stearns Oil & Gas Co. v. Farquharson, Am. Ann. Cas. igiB
B, p. 1212 (1912); Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. St. 36 (1882); Silver v. 
Bush, 213
Pa. 195, 62 AtI. 832 (19o6); Preston v. South Penn Oil Co., 238 Pa. 301, 86 At. 
203
(1913); Detlor v. Holland, 57 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E., 69o (i898).
46 Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, supra.
4TFunk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. St. 229 (1867); Appeal of Stoughton, 
88 Pa, St. 198
(1879); Gill v. Weston, 11o Pa. 305, 312, 1 AtI. 
921 (1885); Westmoreland Gas Co. v.
DeWitt, 130 Pa. 235, iS At. 724 (1889); Hague v. Wheeler, 157 
Pa. 324, 27 Atl. 714
(1893).
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principle so asserted. 8 In the case just alluded to the court con-
strued an act of the Pennsylvania legislature adopted in 1856 and
before petroleum was discovered, and therein held that the term
"'mining lands" as used in this statute included lands from which
oil was produced. At least two courts, in criticizing the doctrine
of Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, maintain that Gill v. Weston is in direct
conflict therewith.49 Notwithstanding the apparent overruling of
the Dunham case, that court had occasion to again affirm the doc-
trine thereof in decisions laid down after the announcement of Gill
v. Weston.50 In these later cases, however, it is specifically held
that parole evidence was admissible bearing on the fact that at the
time the conveyances were made the parties understood the term
"mineral" to include oil and gas. The holding in the Dunham case
is vigorously assailed in West Virginia as being out of line with
the numerous decisions in Pennsylvania to the effect that the term
"mineral" includes oil and gas. 1 However, Ohio follows the prin-
ciple laid down in the Dunham case.
52 While Kentucky, in a late
case, affirms the majority rule, it is held in that jurisdiction that a
conveyance of minerals made in 1871 did not include natural gas,
but this decision was founded on the terms of the instrument itself,
which plainly indicated that natural gas was not in the contempla-
tion of the parties at the time the conveyance was made.
53 Even
the West Virginia court, which adheres to the majority rule most
rigidly, concedes that a grant or reservation of minerals in general
terms may, in certain circumstances, be susceptible of an interpre-
tation which will exclude oil and gas.
5 4 In another jurisdiction the
nature of the deed considered was such that the court held that a
deed of minerals did not include oil and gas, the conveyance under
consideration being a right of way deed.55 But, as already stated,
the great weight of authority supports the proposition that a grant,
reservation or exception of minerals, without specific reference to
oil and natural gas, includes those substances.
41 Gill v. Weston, supra.
4DMurray v. Allred, ioo Tenn. 00, 43 S. W. 355 (1897); McCombs v. Stephenson,
154 Ala. 109, 44 So. 867 (1907). See also Barker v. Campbell, x67 Pac. (Cal., x198) 468,
L. R. A. igi8 A, 487.
" Silver v. Bush, 2x3 Pa. 195, 62 At. 832 0r9o6); Preston v. South Penn Oil Co.,
238 Pa. sox, 86 At. 203 (1913).
"Suit v. Hochstctter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S. E. 307 (19o8).
12 Detlor v. Holland, S7 Ohio St. 492, 49 N. E. 69o (x898).
53.cKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S. W. (Ky.,
19o9) 314.
rAColumbia Gas & Electric Co. v. Moore, 81 W. Va. 164, 93 S. E. 1051 (1917);
Horse Creek Land Co. v. Midkiff, 81 W. Va. 6x6, 95 S. E. 26 (x918).
"Gladys City Oil Co. v. Right of Way Oil Co., xo6 Teax. 94, r37 S. W. 171 (1911).
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(4). Title to Oil and Gas in Place.
This question presents but an aspect of the preceding subject.
Owing to its vast importance, however, it must be treated sepa-
rately. If oil and gas in place are a part of the realty under the
authorities already cited, it would seem to follow as a logical con-
sequence that the owner of the fee has the same absolute title to
the oil and gas in place as he would have in the case of solid min-
erals. Notwithstanding this plain deduction, there is so much con-
fused thought on the subject that a critical inquiry is demanded.
Viewing the cases in their entirety, the great weight of authority
supports the principle that the owner of the fee, or the owner of
the oil and gas by a separate estate, holds an absolute title to these
minerals while in place with the same legal effect as would be true
in the case of solid minerals. The exception to this rule prevails
in Indiana; but even here the tendency is in the direction of the
majority rule. Notwithstanding the posture of the cases on this
question, we find several recent decisions which indicate the ob-
scurity of judicial thought on the subject. Many of the decisions
which are in apparent conflict with the majority rule may be sus-
ceptible of explanation by the observation that the rights there-
under consideration were the rights of an oil and gas lessee rather
than the rights of the owner of the fee, or one claiming a separate
estate in the oil and gas. But at least two recent cases cannot be
disposed of upon that theory. In Lindley v. Raydure,56 which, in
other respects, is a remarkably well written opinion on the law of
oil and gas, Judge Cockran, District Judge for the Eastern District
of Kentucky, announced the broad principle that an oil and gas
lessee takes no title to the oil and gas which may be in the land for
the reason that the lessor himself has no estate therein, and that
this is true because of the fugacious nature of such substances. It
is to be noted here that the learned court goes to the greatest ex-
treme in denying to the owner of the fee any title to the oil and
gas in place. It is not stated that the landowner has a qualified
estate in the oil and gas before reduced to possession, or that he
does not have an absolute estate therein until that circumstance
transpires. The decision is a square announcement of the principle
that, so far as the oil and gas in place are concerned, the landowner
has no title thereto whatsoever. This holding is founded on the
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ohio Oil
Company v. Indiana, which will be discussed later5 T Lindley v.
w Lindley v. Raydure, 239 Fed. (Ky., 1917) 928.
57 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. 190 (1900).
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Raydure was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit.58 So, likewise, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, in a very
recent case, 9 sustains the doctrine that the owner of the fee has
no absolute title to oil and gas in place, but the right only to drill for
oil and gas, coupled with the further right of absolute owner-
ship in the substances when reduced to possession by these opera-
tions. This decision also is founded on the so-called Indiana rule,
as announced in the Ohio Oil Company case. It is, perhaps,'.perti-
nent to observe that before this decision was rendered the Fdderal
Court in Oklahoma held that the so-called Indiana doctrine was the
only exception to the general rule that oil and gas in place are the
absolute property of the owner of the fee.
6
1
It must be obvious that a clear understanding of the exact char-
acter of the title of the owner of the fee to oil and gas is indis-
pensable at this stage of our investigation. This is true because
that conception, either rightly or wrongly reached, will influence
our point of view upon nearly every other question which is in-
volved in this inquiry. Neither the textbook writers nor the com-
mentators approach exactness in the statement of the principle here
involved, and the language of many of the decisions simply tends
to confuse our understanding. First of all, then, we must ascer-
tain the nature of the estate in oil and gas possessed by the owner
of the fee, and as the Indiana cases are the substantial exception
to the general rule, it is necessary to examine them minutely. At
the beginning, the Indiana court seemed to recognize that the owner
of the fee had an absolute title to the oil and gas in place.81 Later
that court adopted the broad assumption that there was a complete
analogy between the ownership of oil and gas and the ownership
of wild animals and fish-namely, that there was no private owner-
ship therein until they were reduced to possession.6
2 Adhering to
this analogy, in a subsequent case it is specifically held that title to
natural gas does not vest in any private owner until it is reduced
to actual possession. In condemnation of that line of authorities
which hold that oil and gas in place are a part of the realty to which
they attach themselves for the time being, it is here observed that
it would be just as unreasonable to say that natural gas passing
through the land of one owner becomes his property as it is to say
IsRaydure v. Lindley, 249 Fed. 675 (x918).
P'Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. (Okia.,'qzx8) 86.
6'Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, X72 Fed. 545 (1909).
OPeoples' Gas Co. v. Tyner, 13x Ind. 277; 408, 3r N. E. 59 (1892); Greenfleld Gas
Co. v. Peoples' Gas Co., x3i Ind. 599, 3 N. E. 61 (*892).
2Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N. E. xg (1897).
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that wild animals passing thereover become his property while on
his land, or that fish, while passing through his stream, become his
property while in the waters abutting his land.65 A companion case
was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, and this
resulted in the leading case of Ohio Oil Company v. Indiana." The
court here announced the rule of property in Indiana on this ques-
tion, as follows: "Although, in virtue of his proprietorship, the
owrier of the surface may bore wells for the purpose of extracting
natural gas and oil, until these substances are actually reduced by him
to possession, he has no title whatever to them as owner; that
is, he had the exclusive right, on his own land, to seek to acquire
them, but they do not become his property until the effort has re-
sulted in domination and control by actual possession." Supple-
menting this announcement, the court, in effect, held that the own-
ers of the surface overlying a gas deposit had such a community in-
terest therein that the State of Indiana, by statute, could prevent
the waste of gas by one of the communal owners, as this was a
detriment to the other owners. In brief, it was asserted that the
purpose of the statute under consideration as to protect each of
the owners in common against waste committed by the other ten-
ants in common. In a subsequent case the doctrine of the Ohio Oil
Company case as broadened to the extent of holding that an in-
junction would lie at the suit of one of the so-called owners in com-
mon of the gas deposit 'to restrain the waste of gas from the com-
mon pool at the instance of one of the other owners of the surface.
But the earlier doctrine of the Indiana courts was here relaxed to
this extent: The court held that natural gas, even when in the
ground in its natural state, possessed in a qualified degree one of
the characteristics or attributes of private property, and this own-
ership was expressly distinguished from the character 6f ownership
in wild animals, which was in the public until reduced to posses-
sion 6 5  But in Rupel v. Ohio Oil Company66 the ultimate conse-
quence of the earlier holdings in Indiana was squarely before the
court. Here a life tenant made an oil and gas lease without the
joinder of the remainderman. The lessee entered, developed the
property and removed a quantity of oil. In this suit for an injunc-
tion and for an accounting brought by the remainderman the defense
was urged that the lessee was in the lawrful possession of the land,
03State v. Ohio Oil Co., i5o Ind. 21, 49 N. E. 8og (i898).
61 Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U. S. Igo (9oo).
,Manufacturers' Gas Co. v. Indiana Gas Co., z55 Ind. 461, 545, 566, 57 N. E.
912 (igo).
ORupel v. Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4, 95 N. E. 225 (1919).
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and in that possession appropriated the oil. The case in this posture
was fully answered by the doctrine in the Ohia Oil Company case to
the effect that the fee owner had the exclusive right to drill on his
own land and to extract the minerals. But the court, in answering
the question, said "But this rule of property does not in any way
modify the general common law that the ownership of the fee of
the surface of the earth carries with it the right to the minerals
beneath, and the consequent right to extract them. * * * Where
oil underlies the surface of the earth it cannot be denied that, for the
time being, it is physically a part of it. To recover it from the
earth requires an assault on the integrity of the estate like, if dif-
ferent in degree, to the taking of other minerals." In a still later
case it is said: "It is settled by numerous decisions that the natural
gas or the petroleum which may be under the surface and not re-
duced to the actual possession of any person constitutes a part of
the land, and belongs to the owner thereof in such sense that he
has the exclusive right by operations upon his land to reduce such
mineral substance to possession67 In another late case it is said:
"Petroleum in and under the earth's surface and not reduced to
actual possession of any person constitutes a part of the land, and
belongs to the owner thereof, who has the right to reduce the min-
eral to possession, or grant the privilege of doing so to other per-
sons."'68 In Fairbanks v. Warrut,60 the latest Indiana case on this
question, it is said: "Noble Warrum at the time of the execution of
said lease was the owner of the fee, the owner of everything that
went to make up the realty. The natural gas beneath the surface
was a part of the realty, and therefore Noble Warrum was the
owner of such gas. By reason of the fugitive character of natural
gas, however, he was such owner only in a qualified sense. As long
as such substance remained beneath the surface of his land he con-
tinued to be such owner until, in some manner, he parted with his
title thereto. But if, by its natural tendency to flow, it should es-
cape to the lands of an adjoining proprietor, such ownership would
thereby cease." It is further said in this opinion that, from a prac-
tical standpoint, Warrum was the owner of the gas while it was
beneath the surface of his land only, in the sense that he bad the
exclusive right, by operations on such land, to explore for it and
reduce it to possession and a consequent absolute ownership. In the
light of these confusing statements by the Indiana court what pre-
U Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N. E. 525 (1905).
c3Kahle v. Crown Oil Co., iSo Ind. 131, oo N. E. 681 (1x3).
O*Fairbank$ v. Warrum, 56 Ind. App. 337, 104 N. E. 983 (19T4).
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cise rule can be deduced from the cases in that jurisdiction? At
first that court stood on the proposition that there was a complete
analogy between the ownership of animals ferae naturae and oil and
gas in place; that there was no such thing as private ownership in oil
and gas until reduced to possession. This extreme position was then
modified by the Supreme Court of the United States, which laid
down two propositions: first, that while the landowner had no title
to the oil or gas in place, he did possess the exclusive right to ex-
plore therefor on his own land, and to reduce these substances to
absolute ownership when found; and from this it follows tlat he
possessed the right to grant this privilege to others. In the second
place it was held, in the case of natural gas at least, that even his
right to explore and to reduce to possession was a qualified one, for
the reason that he and the other surface owners possessed a com-
mon right to explore, each on his own land but into the common
reservoir of gas, and that one of these common owners would not
be permitted to perpetrate waste to the detriment of the other own-
ers in common. Then the Supreme Court of Indiana, in the Manu-
facturers' Gas Company case, followed the Supreme Court of the
United States as to both of these propositions. The cases following
this seem to indicate a relaxation of the strictness of the Ohio Oil
Company rule. They do recognize that oil and gas in place are a
part of the realty, and while in that condition belong to the owner
of the fee. In the Davenport case"° it is said that the fee-owner
owns the oil and gas in place in such a sense that he has the exclu-
sive right to reduce them to possession. Such also is the announce-
ment in the Fairbanks case; but in the Kahle case it is said that the
oil and gas in place belong to the owner of the land, who has the
right to reduce the same to possession. In other words in this last
case the court seems to recognize a distinct owniership to the oil and
gas in place. In a recent article on "Property in Oil and Gas,"
appearing in the YkLr LAW JOURNAL for December, 1919, Profes-
sor Summers, of the University of Kentucky, states that the Indi-
ana court has receded from the extreme viewpoint maintained in the
Ohio Oil Company case. In the consideration of the Ohio Oil Com-
pany and kindred cases these facts must be borne in mind. To be-
gin with, the courts were there concerned with oil and gas leases
and the title held thereunder. The nature of the lessor's title was
incidentally discussed. In the second place the subject-matter there
dealt with was natural gas, instead of oil, which, being a volatile
* Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25, 76 N. E. 525 ('905).
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substance, has a greater tendency toward migration than oil, al-
though even here in a state of nature the mineral maintains its situs.
Finally, a critical examination of the Indiana cases, including the
Ohio Oil Company case leaves the strong impression that the courts
were inclined to put the public welfare above mere considerations of
private ownership for the reason that the subject-matter there dealt
with, namely, natural gas, possessed very great value as fuel for
manufacturing and domestic purposes. When these points of dis-
tinction are taken into consideration with the clear relaxation of the
original doctrine of the Ohio Oil Company case, as evidenced by
the later Indiana decisions, the so-called "Indiana rule" loses its im-
portance as an authority on this question.
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky first held that a fee-owner
had an absolute title to the oil. and gas in place.7 - Then later, where
gas alone was involved, that court seems to follow the Ohio Oil
Company case.7 2 Then again, the Federal Court in Kentucky, in
Lindley v. Raydur, 7 3 already alluded to, stoutly maintains the orig-
inal doctrine of the Ohio Oil Company case. Oklahoma also appar-
ently follows the early Indiana rule.7 4 Notwithstanding this, it is
held in that jurisdiction that the right to explore for oil and gas and
to appropriate the same may be granted or reserved.7 5 We have al-
ready said that the distinction between a grant or reservation of oil
and gas in place in the sense that solid minerals may be granted or
reserved, and the grant or reservation of the right to explore for
these minerals and appropriate them, if found, is wholly superfi-
cial. The holding in Rich v. Doneghey, following the Indiana case,
and the holdings of Barker v. Camnpbell-Ratcliff Land Company and
Ramey v., Stephney, cannot be reconciled upon any rational theory.
These cases and the nice distinctions drawn therein simply demon-
strate the utter confusion of judicial thought on this question in
general. The rule in Indiana that the landowners whose tracts
overlay a deposit have a common interest therein and that- one of
the adjoining owners may restrain the waste of gas by one of the
other owners is not followed in any state except Kentucky.7 6 The
rule in other states is 'that the adjoining landowners- must protect
7 Hail v. Reed, x5 B. Monroe (Ky., 1854) 479.
7Gas Company v. Kentucky Heating Co., u17- Ky. 71, 77 S. W. 368 (1903).
72Lindley v. Raydure, 239 Fed. 928 (1917).
"4 Rich v. Doneghey, 177 Pac. (Okla., gi8) 86.
"sBarker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 167 Pac. (Okla., 1917) 468; Ramey v.
Stephney, 173 Pac. (Okla., 1918) 72.
"Commonwealth v. Trent, 117 K y. 34, 77 S. W. 390 (1903); Gas Co. v. Heating
CO., 117 Ky. 7z, 77 S. W. 368 (1903); Gas Co. v. Heating Co., 132 Ky. 435, I1 S. W.
474 (19o8).
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himself by drilling offset wells.77 Even in Indiana, where the
defendant was using artificial means to produce an undue portion
of the gas from the common deposit, which was contrary to the
statute of that state, the plaintiff was denied the remedy of injunc-
tion because he was using the same methods, although not in the
same degree.7 8  In Kentucky it is held that the state may enact a
statute to prevent the waste of gas under the conservation policy of
the state."' Recurring again to the initial question as to the charac-
ter of title to oil and gas in place the overwhelming weight of au-
thority supports the proposition that the fee-owner or the owner of
a separate estate in the oil and gas holds those minerals while in
place by an absolute title and to the same extent exactly as title to
solid minerals is vested. In Pennsylvania the question before the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the Ohio Oil Company case
was squarely presented, and it was contended that where gas wells
were producing from a common reservoir one of the owners wast-
ing the gas should be restrained at the suit of one of the other own-
ers. The trial court, in answering the question as to whether the
defendant's right to the gas underlying his land was absolute
and independent of the other owners whose tracts overlaid
the common reservoir, or qualified and correlative because of
the fugitive nature of gas, followed the doctrine of the Ohio Oil
Company case. The Supreme Court, in reversing this holding, an-
nounced that the dominion of the defendant over the gas was as
absolute as it would have been in the case of solid minerals, and
that the oil and gas in place under his land were his absolute prop-
erty. 0 In West Virginia the rule is that oil and gas in place are the
property of the oWner of the land in the same sense and in the
same degree as would be true in the case of solid minerals.81 In
Williamson v. Jones also the question of qualified ownership as
distinguished from absolute ownership of oil and gas was squarely
raised, the decision being that the title was absolute. Such also is the
' Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 49 N. E. 399 (1897); Hague v. Wheeler,
257 Pa. 324, 27 Atl, 714 (1893); Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa., 379, 44 AtI. 1074
(igoo); Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co., 216 Pa. 362, 65 Atl. 8ox (907); Higgins Oil
& Fuel Co. v. Guaranty Oil Co., 82 So. (La., 199) 206.
78
11o Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas Co., 174 Ind. 635, 92 N. E. i (i9o).
7
1
Commonwealth v. Trent, 117 Ky. 34, 77 S. W. 390 (1903).
6'Hague v. Wheeler, X57 Pa. 324, 27 At. 714 (1893). See also: Jones v. Foresi
Oil Co., 194 Pa. 379, 44 At. 1074 (goo); Barnard v. Monongahela Gas Co., 216 Pa.
362, 65 AtI. 8oi (1907); Chartiers Coal Co. v. Mellon, 152 Pa. 286, 25 At. 597 (2893).
S Brown v. Spilman, x55 U. S. 665 -(895); Williamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va. 231,
19 S. E. 436 (1894); Williamson v. Jones, 43 W. Va., 562, 27 S. E. 411 (1897); Wilson
v. Youst, 43 W. Va. 826, 28 S. E. 78x (897); Preston v. White, 57 W. Va. 278, 5o S.
E. 236 (1905).
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rule in Ohio, 2 New York, 3 Texas,84 Arkansas, 5 and Tennessee."8
This question is not only important from the standpoint of the title
held by the fee-owner, but it is of far-reaching consequence in the
determination of the nature of the rights created by an oil and gas




m Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St., 317, 49 N. E. 399 (1897); Northwestern Oho
Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio St. 259, 67 N. E. 494 (1903).
"Hughes v. United Pipe Line Co., xx9 N. Y. 423, 23 N. E. 1042 (189O).
U Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 1o7 Tex. 226, 176 S. W. 7r7 (x915).
u Os orn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil Co., xo3 Ark. 175, 146 S. W. 122 (1912).
"Murray v. Allred, ioo Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355 (1897).
